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Abstract 
 
Thirteen years after the beginning of the democratization process in South Africa, many 
radical socio-political and institutional transformations have taken place in the country. 
Unlike during the Apartheid era, natural resource management and governance, particularly in 
the water sector, is nowadays based on concepts and criteria such as decentralization, 
economic efficiency, environmental sustainability and social equity. These criteria, which 
represent the pillars of the South African National Water Act (NWA-1998), are universally 
recognized as the fundaments of sustainable development and are widely employed in the 
definition of the environmental policies of the industrialized countries. 
To accompany this socio- political revolution, a process of institutional building is taking 
place in the South African water sector. New organizations, namely the Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs) and the Water Users Associations (WUAs) in charge of  local 
governance of water are being established in the country.  
These new organizations urgently need tools, methods, processes that can help them in their 
difficult task of implementing locally the NWA by promoting the participation of local 
stakeholders in the process of water management and allocation. In particular, there is a need 
to gain a better understanding of collective decision mechanisms. In the South African 
context, participatory approaches – involving local stakeholders, decision-makers and 
researchers- have been implemented to accompany the water allocation process at catchment 
scale : the Kat River catchment was used as a pilot study to develop a role-playing game 
(KatAware –based on multi-agent simulations) accompanying the negotiation between water 
users on the allocation rules of irrigation water. However, the lessons of this experience are 
not easily transferable to other sites or situations. The objectives of our work are therefore to 
assess the impact of the context on the outcome of a collective decision: by identifying the 
contextual elements influencing most on individual behaviour and on collective action, we 
could then build negotiation-support tools which are more easily transferable from one 
context to another. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper describes and discusses the work of construction and test of an experimental 
protocol adopting a simplified Role-Playing Game (RPG) to test hypotheses issued from 
Cooperative Game Theory (CGT). The RPG context refers to the case of common property 
water allocation among farmers and derives from observations made during a participatory 
project on water governance in the Kat River Basin (Eastern Cape, South Africa). 
 
During this experience based on an approach called Companion Modelling (ComMod), a 
RPG called KatAWARE (Farolfi et al., 2008)  was developed to reproduce the functioning of 
a real catchment – the Kat River - and allowed local stakeholders (members of a Water Users 
Association, WUA) to play around water management in order to : 
- understand the complexity of the system; 
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- understand the relations between agents; 
- understand the impact of different water allocation strategies on the water flows, the 
profits, employment and domestic users’ satisfaction; 
- build up a catchment strategy within a WUA. 
 
The ComMod process involved local stakeholders to play two sessions of the KatAWARE 
RPG (Farolfi et al., 2008). Once the ComMod process ended, the RPG outcomes (first 
session) were compared with theoretical results from a CGT model calibrated on the same 
data (Dinar et al, 2008). Several similarities resulted from this comparison, even if the 
complexity and the dynamic nature of the RPG determined differences in absolute terms. In 
particular, the distribution of the payoffs among the three sub-basins that resulted from the 
CGT model was similar to the one exhibited as an outcome of the RPG session. 
 
The encouraging, though still vague, results of this first comparison between RPG and CGT 
outcomes suggested to deepen the analysis in the direction of an experimental use of the RPG 
in order to test some hypotheses made by the CGT.  
 
To do so, the Kat RPG was simplified and “polished” of all elements needed when used in the 
context of stakeholders’ negotiation support, but not directly related to the CGT hypotheses 
being tested. Nevertheless, a certain degree of contextualization was maintained:farmers 
producing cabbage compete for irrigation water, stock of water available in a dam, etc. This 
simplified RPG was used to conduct contextualized experiments (CE) in the laboratory. The 
adoption of these CE to test CGT hypotheses triggers an important research question about 
the use of contextualized tools derived from a negotiation process as a laboratory experiment 
to test hypotheses. This question is particularly unconventional in the field of Experimental 
Economics, where experiments are usually conducted in a very de-contextualized way (Eber 
and Willinger, 2005) in order to avoid different understanding of the context by the players 
due to their culture, education, experience, personality, which influence their own perception 
of the context. 
 
A reverse research trajectory would consist  of re-building progressively context from a very 
abstract and de-contextualized experimental protocol. The analysis of the influence of  the 
introduction of contextual elements on players’ behaviour would represent an interesting 
research question. This issue is treated in the last section of the paper. 
 
The following text is organized as follows. The origin of the research question is introduced 
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the theoretical benchmark and the proposed CE to test the 
theoretical hypotheses. Section 4 concludes and provides the way forward of this research 
activity. 
2. Origin of the research question 
One of the principles of an experiment is to give a study the possibility to be reproduced 
afterwards. Rouchier (2006) discusses two different approaches that gather empirical data and 
link them to models and simulations: Experimental Economics, and Companion Modelling 
(ComMod) (ComMod Group, 2003). The latter approach uses tools such as models and RPG 
to “accompany observed social groups when they negotiate over renewable resource issues”. 
 
A ComMod RPG is a negotiation process that takes place in the field. The ‘field’, unlike the 
‘laboratory’ used in EE, is an environment that has not been constructed or handled by an 
experimenter, who therefore cannot control it. The field is also a complex system. The two 
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main objectives of ComMod RPGs are firstly to understand complex environments, and 
secondly to support collective decision in complex situations (ComMod Group, 2003). These 
objectives correspond to a global objective of increasing the knowledge for both the scientist 
and the stakeholders through a permanent and iterative confrontation between field 
circumstances and modelling processes.  
 
In some ComMod experiences, like the one in the Kat River, the researcher starts building a 
first preliminary model to explicit the theoretical “pre-conceptions” (Farolfi and Rowntree, 
2007). The confrontation of this first model with the stakeholders allows revising and re-
building it, taking into account the field situation and the stakeholders’ questions and remarks. 
This dynamic process leads to the construction either of a new model derived from the 
previous one or a totally new one. Stakeholders learn collectively by creating, modifying and 
observing simulations (ComMod Group, 2003). Local stakeholders are part of the framing 
RPG process in the ComMod approach. As a consequence, RPGs developed with ComMod 
are unique. Therefore, it is impossible to reproduce the same experiment with others players 
in order to gather data and compare it. Rouchier (2006) stresses that the first and most obvious 
limit of ComMod RPGs is “the lack of accumulation of a knowledge that could be 
generalized to more than one situation”. Repeatability of the experience is the strength of 
Experimental Economics, which gets back the standards of the classical experimental 
approach.  
 
In a ComMod approach, which involves many disciplines in the analysis (e.g. Sociology, 
Psychology, Economics, etc.) many phenomena could be observed and some could be seen as 
‘exhibits’, consisting in empirical regularities that are discovered and for which, at the time, 
there are no well-developed theoretical explanations (Sugden, 2005). ComMod RPG could 
give rise to new research questions derived from the results, but different from the original 
research framework. An example of emergence of a new research question during a ComMod 
approach took place in the Kat River project (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007). This ComMod 
experience included a RPG played by local stakeholders (members of a WUA) in order to 
understand the complexity of the system, the relation between agents around water 
management, and also the impact of the strategies of water allocation in the field in order to 
build up a common strategy for the WUA. The two RPG sessions played during the ComMod 
experience allowed observing cooperation among the different players in the use of the water 
available from the Kat dam, situated upstream the catchment. This observation suggested an 
attempt of comparison between the results obtained through one of the two RPG sessions and 
a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) model calibrated on the same data (Dinar et al., 2008). 
The comparison showed some similarities about players’ behaviours and the distribution of 
profits (payoffs) among players. It was an encouraging result with regard to the attempt to 
compare outcomes emerged through both empirical and theoretical approaches. However, 
these two approaches show many differences that cannot allow concluding definitely about 
the robustness of such similarities in the outcomes. Replications were therefore needed to 
verify the soundness of the results. Consequently the idea emerged to construct a “polished”, 
though still contextualized game derived from the RPG used in the Kat to replicate 
experiments in order to test cooperative behaviour of agents around water allocation. 
 
A common agreement among experimenters in the EE research field is to conduct 
experiments in a lab and to make the context of the experimental instructions as neutral 
(decontextualized) as possible. It is argued that, when contextual elements are introduced, the 
experimenter looses control of the experimental parameters, since players have different 
interpretations of a real context. The reasoning is that a real context might contaminate 
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behaviour which possibly makes ambiguous the interpretation of the outcomes (Harrison and 
List, 2004; Eber and Willinger, 2005). The idea is that the players have a same perception of a 
general and neutral issue. For example each one could interpret differently an economic 
context issue, such as two players respectively named ‘seller’ and ‘buyer’ in an auction or 
ultimatum game, or ‘monopolist’ and ‘entrant’ in a market game. In a context generalization, 
they become ‘player A’ and ‘player B’ in the experimental instructions (Cooper and Kagel, 
2003). 
 
However, it is not strictly true that subjects have the same perception of a neutral context. If 
the subjects do not understand what the experimental task is about, meaning that they do not 
know what actions are feasible and what are the consequences of different actions, then 
control is lost at a basic level (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). Nevertheless, it must also be 
recognized that inappropriate choice of field referents may trigger uncontrolled psychological 
motivations. The choice between an abstract context and one with field referents must be 
guided by the research question (Harrison and List, 2004). 
 
In the ComMod approach, stakeholders are involved in the design of the Role-Playing Game; 
consequently in order to facilitate the understanding and discussion of the problem at stake, 
the game is as much “contextualized” as possible.  
 
By using a CE derived from a ComMod experience to run experiments in a laboratory, the 
question is to verify if such contextualized game can be useful to test theoretical assumptions 
backing the exhibited phenomena. 
3. The theoretical benchmark and the contextualized protocol 
Game Theory studies strategic behaviour of decision-makers in situations where one player’s 
decisions affect the other players. The basic assumption of Game Theory is that decision 
makers are rational players and take into account other decision-makers’ rationality to build 
expectations on their behaviour (Parrachino et al., 2006a). There are two main branches of 
Game Theory, the first is Non-Cooperative Game Theory and the second is Cooperative 
Game Theory (CGT). Unlike Non-Cooperative Game Theory, CGT does not focus on the 
coalition building among players but rather studies the possible results of cooperation. More 
particularly, CGT objective is to determine what coalition could be formed among the players 
in a game and how coalition gains are shared among its members. Specifically, CGT focuses 
on the solutions of the grand coalition that includes all the players. Supposing that the players 
agree to work together on a certain objective, the main question in cooperative game models 
is how to allocate the earnings of a coalition among its members. Different solution concepts 
of the payoff sharing issue are developed in CGT and could be provided as a subset (e.g. the 
Core) or as a one-point (unique) solution (e.g. the Shapley value) (Parrachino et al., 2006a and 
2006b; Dasgupta, 2007). 
 
The Shapley value solution vector satisfies individual and group rationality. It is defined such 
as each player’s reward xi equals a weighted average of the contributions the player makes to 
each coalition of which he is a member (Parrachino et al., 2006a). The Shapley value (cf. 
annex) represents a “fair” payoff sharing, taking into account the players’ strength and 
weaknesses (Tisdell and Harrison, 1992). 
 
3.1. The protocol building process 
The bridge that links a given RPG and its experimental “abstract” version (CE) could be 
crossed following two directions:  
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- a “top-down” approach that means a degradation (i.e. decontextualization or abstraction) of 
the context in which the RPG players are initially involved; 
- a “bottom-up” approach that means to move from an abstract context (as developed in 
laboratory experiments) onto a contextualized game (Wang, 1996), by adding contextual 
bricks in order to obtain a RPG (i.e. a contextualized experiment). 
 
The trajectory illustrated so far can be identified as a “top-down” approach, as the RPG 
KatAWARE was degraded into the CE focusing on CGT issues. A question emerged at this 
stage: in the degradation process, what factors influence the choice to keep or to leave a given 
contextual “brick”? Similarly, in a “bottom-up” approach, this question could be seen as the 
difficulty to choose the bricks and their ordering during the context building process. 
 
What justified the construction of a “contextualized” protocol version for experiments was the 
fact that Kat Aware in its initial version can be played only in the Kat River context (cf. 
section 1). Therefore, it needed to be adapted to allow controlled repeatability in other 
contexts. The new CE could be played in a controlled context (the lab) with players that are 
not the “Kat” committed stakeholders. 
 
3.2. The CE 
The experimental set-up aims at testing the Cooperative Game Theory hypotheses that lie 
behind these results. The protocol mobilizes 5 aspects of a cooperative rationality:  
 
1) Players’ rationality (selfishness) and profit maximization;  
2) Players’ capacity to take advantage of the side payments in coalitions;  
3) Players’ behaviour in terms of resources (water, land) allocation within a coalition;  
4) Players’ choice to stay in partial or grand coalition (because of the particular case of this 
game); 
5) If players stay in the grand coalition, allocation of coalition’s payoff in comparison with 
the Shapley values. 
 
The experiment consists of a water resource management game. Water is stored in a dam. 
Three farmers, cabbage producers, have to require water from the dam if they want to irrigate 
more area than their initial endowment. The game is a one-shot round, meaning that the 
farmers play only one period, corresponding to one year. 
 
The CGT model which underlies the game derives from the CGT model used in the Kat River 
Basin (Dinar et al., 2008).Each farmer has a specific production function but each one initially 
gets an area endowment set at 20 Ha he may increase up to a maximum of 40 Ha.The farmers 
have the same initial area endowment (20 Ha) but they have different production functions. 
Each farmer may increase his cultivated area to a maximum of 40 Ha. If a farmer chooses to 
increase the cultivated area, he needs water from the dam. In that case, he must demand an 
additional amount of water from the dam manager (played by the experimenter). Therefore, 
the farmer’s decision is made at two, interrelated, levels: firstly, the cabbage producer 
eventually demand an additional amount of water from the dam, and then he decides about the 
additional area to cultivate according to the water allocation decided by the dam manager. The 
dam has a capacity of 350 000 m3 of which 100 000 m3 must be preserved for domestic 
consumption and the ecological reserve. 
 
The experiment is composed of three phases. During the first phase, the three farmers play as 
singletons. They choose the area to cultivate and the corresponding water required without 
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communication with the other farmers. During the second phase, two farmers play together in 
a partial coalition whilst the third farmer still plays alone. The partial coalition is presented to 
the farmers as an “informal group”. The farmers forming the partial coalition choose together 
the area cultivated by each one and the amount of water they require. The profit obtained is 
common between the two farmers and side-payments are allowed. The side-payments theory 
is based on the assumption that “the coalitional utility function is expressed in units of a 
divisible commodity which stores utility, and which can be transferred without losses to the 
players”. If a coalition can obtain a total utility, this utility can be divided among the members 
of the coalition in any possible way. It is possible to transfer money among the players in 
order to reallocate the profit gained through the coalition. Such games satisfying these 
assumptions are called “transferable-utility games” (Parrachino et al., 2006a).  
 
Finally, in the third phase, communication is allowed between the three players who play 
together in a grand coalition. The same cooperative principle as in the second phase with two 
farmers is generalized to the group including all the farmers. The grand coalition is presented 
to the players as an “irrigation board”, and consequently the farmers in the board manage 
collectively the water available from the dam.  
 
In the instructions provided to the players, theoretical CGT terms were changed into more 
colloquial words. For instance, terms as ‘partial coalition’ and ‘grand coalition’ were named 
respectively “informal group decision” and “irrigation board”. 
 
This protocol proceeds in a testing phase and is not still fully developed to be implemented in 
an experimental way. 
4. Conclusion and research perspectives 
During the participatory project conducted in the Kat River Basin, a ComMod approach was 
implemented. Stakeholders played a RPG articulated around water management in order to 
understand the complexity of the local system and to build up a catchment strategy within the 
local water users association. The ComMod approach exhibited some regularities in the 
stakeholders’ behaviour that seemed worth further investigation. The outcomes of the RPG 
conducted with local stakeholders in the field were first compared with theoretical results 
predicted by a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) model calibrated on the same data. Some 
similarities in the grand coalition payoff sharing appeared and suggested to deepen this 
comparison through an experimental use of a simplified version of the RPG (i.e. the CE) to 
test a certain number of hypotheses made by the CGT. The EE approach was chosen because, 
unlike the ComMod approach used in the Kat, it provides the possibility to reproduce many 
times the same experiment in order to gather data and capitalize knowledge. However, EE 
commonly develops experimental protocols which are decontextualized. Consequently, the 
overall question treated by this research project is whether a contextualized experiment is 
useful to test theoretical hypotheses, and particularly how to simplify or adapt the context to 
run valid experiments. 
 
The results obtained through a repeated use of the contextualized experiment were compared 
with those of the CGT model. The comparison of the results obtained provided insights on the 
correspondence between hypothetical and real behaviour of players when facing a situation of 
common pool resource (water) allocation in different conditions of cooperation. 
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However, the experimental protocol is not completely definite. Some context aspects remain 
to be discussed. Particularly, in the present game, water is required for free from the dam. 
This feature was chosen to simplify the experiment. 
 
A fully abstract protocol (AP) is currenltly being developed following the top-down approach 
presented above. It consists of a three-phases game as the CE: 1) singletons; 2) partial 
coalitions; 3) grand coalition. In this AP, abstract terms instead of water management specific 
terms are used. For instance, the dam is identified with a “common-pool”, water becomes 
“tokens” and the farmers are generic “players”.  This AP is more consistent with classical 
protocols used in Experimental Economics than the CE protocol; it allows a complete control 
of the parameters. Therefore, the hypotheses formulated on the basis of the RPG observations 
can be tested in a strict experimental way. 
 
The comparison of the AP results with the CE ones should provide a first lesson about the 
influence of the context on players’ behaviour. However, only the influence of the context 
elements as a whole is evaluated. The impact of each context element (that is “water” on a 
one hand, “farmers” on another hand, etc.) remains to be evaluated separately. The protocol 
building process therefore could be made in a “bottom-up” approach. It consists in starting 
from the AP, and adding and ordering each contextual element (considered as an elementary 
“brick”) to obtain new contextualized protocols, each one being designed to test the impact of 
a particular contextual “brick”. By a “top-down” approach, the simplification of the initial 
situation (RPG) in order to isolate specific elements and to test hypotheses based from the 
RPG observations, reaches to a first block of experimental protocols. By a “bottom-up” 
approach, the context re-building process made in order to test the influence of contextual 
“bricks” on players’ behaviour provides a second cycle of experiments. Many experiments 
could be obtained from a first experience (a RPG developed in the field) by following these 
two protocol building ways, each experiment being designed to test specific hypotheses. 
	
 	

 !
 
 8 
References 
 
ComMod Group (2003). Our Companion Modelling Approach. Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation, 6(1), available at: 
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/2/1.html 
 
Cooper D.J., Kagel J.H. (2003) The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in 
signalling games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol.50, 311-337 
 
Dasgupta P. (2007) Lectures on Game Theory, CEEPA, Pretoria, June 2007. 
 
Dinar A., Farolfi S., Patrone F., Rowntree K. (2008) To negotiate or to game theorize: 
evaluating water allocation mechanisms in the Kat Basin, South Africa, in: Dinar, Albiac and 
Sanchez-Soriano (eds.) “Game Theory and Policy Making in Natural Resources and the 
Environment”, Routledge 
 
Eber N., Willinger M. (2005) L’Economie Experimentale. Collection “Reperes”, Edition La 
Decouverte, Paris. 
 
Farolfi S., Rowntree K. (2007) Accompanying Local Stakeholders in Negotiation Processes 
related to Water Allocation through Simulation Models and Role-Playing Games: an 
Experience from South Africa, EMPOWERS, issue2, January 2007. 
 
Farolfi S., Gumede, H., Rowntree K. and Jones N. (2008) Local water governance in South 
Africa: to which extent participatory approaches facilitate multi-stakeholder negotiations? 
The Kat River Valley experience, Proceedings of the XIII World Water Congress, 
Montpellier. 
 
Harrison G.W., List J.A. (2004) Field Experiments, Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4) 
 
Parrachino I., Zara S. and Patrone F. (2006a). Cooperative Game Theory and its 
application to natural environmental and Water resource Issues: 1. Basic Theory. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4072 
 
Parrachino I., Dinar A. and Patrone F. (2006b) Cooperative Game Theory and its 
Application to Natural, Environmental, and Water Resource Issues: 3. Application to Water 
Resources. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4074 
 
Pillutla M.M., Chen X-P. (1999) Social Norms and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The 
Effects of Context and Feedback. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
Vol.48, No.2, 81-103 
 
Rouchier J. (2006) Data Gathering to Build and Validate Small-Scale Social Models for 
Simulation. In Rennard, J.P., (Ed), Handbook of Research on Nature Inspired Computing for 
Economics and Management, Hershey Chapter XV 
 
Sugden R. (2005) Experiments as exhibits and experiments as test, Journal of Economic 
Methodology 12:2, 291-302 
 
	
 	

 !
 
 9 
Tisdell J.G, Harrison S.R. (1992) Estimating an optimal Distribution of Water Entitlements, 
Water Resources Research, vol. 28, No. 12, 3111-3117. 
 
Wang X.T. (1996) Domain-Specific Rationality in Human Choices: Violations of Utility 
Axioms and Social Contexts, Cognition, 60, 31-63. 
	
 	

 !
 
 10 
Annex 
 
Let N be a finite set of n players, S a subset of N composed by s players, and v a real-
valued function defined over all the subsets of N. Commonly, v is the payoff obtained, 
such as the payoff obtained by farmer i as singleton is noted v(i) and the payoffs for the 
coalitions S and N are v(S) and v(N) respectively. 
 
Shapley proposed that there exists a unique value  that satisfies the conditions of 
efficiency, dummy player property, anonymity and additivity (cf. Parrachino et al., 
2006a). For all i  N: 
i(v) =  [s! (n-s-1)!]* [ v(S U {i}) – v(S) ] / n! 
 
The Shapley value could be interpreted as follows: 
Considering any permutation  of the set N and any player i  N. If P(i, ) is the set of 
players that precede i in the permutation , M(i, ) = v(P(i, )U{i}) – v(P(i, )) is the 
marginal contribution of i to the coalition P(i, ). The Shapley value will be: 
 
i(v) = 1/n!   M(i, ) 
 
Considering a situation with n players agreeing to meet in a certain room, imagine the n 
players entering one at a time into that room in a random order (specified by the 
permutation ) and that each player, as soon as he enters and reaches the coalition S 
created by the players arrived before him, receives a reward equal to v(SU{i})-v(S), that 
is his marginal contribution. 
 
The Shapley value is the mean marginal contribution, averaged on all of the n! 
permutations . 
 
